#### Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Integrity - Service - Excellen ce

## Air Force Reserve Overview



Brig Gen C. E. Martinez Mobilization Assistant DCS Warfighting Integration 19 December 2003

As of:



#### Overview

- Today's Air Force Reserve
  - Who We Are
  - What We Do
  - OIF Mobilization
- Recruiting & Retention Summary
- Challenges
- Summary



#### Air Force MAJCOMs



We are one of nine major commands of the Department of the Air Force.



**Air Combat Command** 



Air Education and Training Command



🥯 Air Force Materiel Command



Air Force Reserve Command



Air Force Space Command



Air Force Special Operations Command



Air Mobility Command



Pacific Air Forces



United States Air Forces in Europe



#### AFRC & ANG Comparison

#### **AFRC**

**ANG** 



Missions

75,800

Most USAF Missions
IMAs
Weather
Aerial Spray
Fire Fighting

Commander (Dual hatted)

Command Headquarters
3 NAFs, 36 Wings (UE &
Assoc) & 4 Detached Groups
Approx 13,000 IMAs

107,000

Most USAF Missions
State Missions
Air Defense
Fire Fighting



Governor/Director Readiness Center State AGs 89 Wings (UE)



#### Dual Hat Responsibilities

# Lt Gen James E. Sherrard, III is Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve & Command

Chief of Air Force Reserve | Commander,

Responsibilities:

- Policy
- Planning
- Programming
- Budget
- Report to Congress

e Commander, Air Force Reserve Command


**Responsibilities:** 

- Supervision
- Maintenance
- Training

Safoty



### Air Force End Strength FY 2004




Data from FY 2004 President's Budget



#### Air Force Reserve Command

<del>FY 2004</del>





#### inaiviauai Mobilization Augmentee (IMA)

- ProgramTrain as Individuals at Active Duty Locations
- Serve at Wing, MAJCOM, Air Staff, Joint Staff, OSD, Other Agency and Combatant **Commander Levels**
- Medical, Intelligence, JAG and Chaplains are Centrally Managed Programs
- To meet the requirements of FY 97 NDAA, **ADCON** is Responsibility of AFRC/CC; **OPCON & TACON are Responsibility of Active Duty Organizations**



#### AFRC Numbered Air Forces



- **→** Administer/Supervise Unit Program
- Provide Logistics Support
- Review/Manage Unit Tasking
- **Ensure Combat Readiness**



## Types of AFRC Flying Units

- Unit Equipped
  - Own their aircraft 441 Total Aircraft Assigned
  - Self-contained

- Associate
  - Collocated with active duty units
  - Share aircraft/weapon system and responsibilities



#### Unit Equipped

#### **Airlift**

- C-5A
- C-141C
- C-130E/H/J
- **■** C-9

#### Rescue

- HH-60G
- HC-130

#### **Air Refueling**

KC-135E/R

#### **Special Operations**

MC-130E

#### **Weather Reconnaissance**

WC-130H/J

#### **Bomber**

■ B-52H

#### **Fighter**

- F-16 C/D
- A/OA-10A

#### **Space**

DMSP Satellite



#### Associate Units

#### **Airlift**

- C-5A/B
- C-17

#### **Air Refueling**

- KC-10
- KC-135R

#### **Fighters**

F-16C/D

#### **Airborne Warning**

E-3 AWACS

#### **Special Ops**

MC-130P

#### **Training**


T-38/T-37/T-1/T-6

#### **Space**

- DSP & GPS Satellites
- SBIRS II




#### Air Force Reserve Locations






#### Active/Reserve/Guard Aircrew Percentage Mix





## Operational Support






#### Cost Effectiveness

#### **Total Air Force Budget**



Supplied by AFRC - 20+ %





#### AFR Mobilization

Cumulative Mobilizations - 25,000+

■Total Mobilized for 2nd Year - 3,100+

Currently Mobilized - 9,300+

Final Demobilizations Dates Pending



#### AFRC Mobilization



GWOT Peak Mobilization was during OIF <u>15,332</u> (16 Apr 03)

Desert Shield/Storm Peak Mobilization 23,013

Total Number of AF Reservists 23,700+ Mobilized for GWOT



#### Air Force Reserve Contribution OIF Strategic Airlift







#### C-17

- 45% of AF crews
- Combat Airdrop
- Operating into Iraq Airfields
- C-5
  - 50% of AF crews
- C-141C
  - 40 AC (90% of C-141s)
  - Aeromedical Evac Msn
  - Repatriate POWs

AFRC has 51% of Total Force
Airlift Crews



## Air Force Reserve Contribution OIF Tankers





- KC-10
  - 25% of AF crews
- KC-135
  - 25% of AF crews
- Airbridge
- Theater Refueling

AFRC has 23% of Total Force
Tanker Crews



## Air Force Reserve Contribution



#### U.S. AIR FORCE OF Bombers and AWACS



#### B-52

- 33% of crews
- LITENING II pod— First use on B-52
  - Strategic Attack &

AFRC has 8% of Total Force B-52 Crews

#### E-3 AWACS

- 20% of crews
- Airborne Warning& Control

AFRC has 11% of Total Force
AWACS Crews



## Air Force Reserve Contribution OIF Combat Rescue





#### HH-60

- 33% of AF crews
- Combat Rescue
- HC-130
  - 33% of AF crews
  - Combat Rescue

AFRC has 30% of Total Force Combat Rescue Crews



#### Air Force Reserve Contribution OIF Special Operations





#### MC-130 E/P

- 62% of AF crews
- Special Ops

AFRC has 56% of Total Force Special Operations Crews



**U.S. AIR FORCE** 

### Air Force Reserve Contribution

<del>OIF Combat Support</del>



#### Security Forces

- 2165 Mobilized (1 Mar 02)

#### Civil Engineers

- 549 Mobilized (16 Apr 02)

#### Aerial Porters

- 921 Mobilized (16 Apr 02)

• Hatelligeage for Particular

- 497 Mobilized (16 Apı Integrity - Service Excellence



### Air Force Reserve Contribution



<del>OIF Enabler—Space</del>





- 6<sup>th</sup> Space Ops Sq (DMSP Satellites) Meteorology
- 9<sup>th</sup> Space Ops Sq—Aerospace Ops Center
  - 8<sup>th</sup> Space Warning Sq (SBIRS Satellites) Missile Warning
- 14<sup>th</sup> Test Squadron--Space Aggressor and Test
- 19<sup>th</sup> Space Ops Sq (GPS Satellites) Navigation
- 310<sup>th</sup> Security Forces Sq—Space Security



#### AFRC Personnel

- 372 unit personnel
- 557 individual mobilization augmentees



## OVERVIEW Historical Context



- Pre-9/11
  - Predictability
  - 100% Volunteerism
- Post-9/11
  - Existing AEF requirements PLUS...
  - Surge requirements which drove nearimmediate mobilization
  - Unplanned Homeland Security requirements at AFRC bases
  - Heavy CONUS CAP requirements

Continued...



## OVERVIEW Historical Context



- Rolling into OIF
  - Transitioning MPA volunteers to mobilized (PM) status (CENTCOM dictated)
  - Mob authority limitation—unknown duration of OIF
- Post-Iraqi Regime Change—current
  - Undefined requirements
  - Redeployment issues
  - Demobilization requirements



## Lessons Learned / Problems Identified



- Force Structure / Readiness
- Lengthy Mobilization
- Change in Planning / Execution Paradigm
- System Support
- Redeployment Priorities
- Optimizing Volunteerism
- Member and Community



## Force Structure / Readiness



- Pre-9/11 funded Total Force structure and readiness
  - Good News
    - Air Force Reserve funded at C-1 readiness level
    - Air Force Reserve trained and funded to respond in 72 hours
    - AEF construct gave sourcing functionality and readiness statistics down to the UTC level
  - Bad News
    - Force structure based on pre-9/11 assessment of Homeland Security requirements
      - Security Forces needed for AFRC base security dual tasked
      - Sustained Combat Air Patrol requirement drain on fighter, tanker, and AWACS resources
    - AEF construct not easily adapted to sourcing rapidly changing requirements
      - Tough to manage volunteers and mobilized Reservists at same time
      - Different "communities" manage different AEF mission areas
- Lesson Learned
  - AF Corporate Structure needs to continue to reassess emerging requirements to insure proper force structure and funding
  - AEF construct evaluation is underway



#### Lengthy Mobilization



#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**

- PM for GWOT is the longest sustained, large-scale mobilization in the history of the Air Force
  - Only 5% of AF Reserve members have been mobilized for two years, however...
    - Critical career fields exist
    - ARC members are maxing out their 24-month clock
      - Issues with CoCOMs and gaining MAJCOMs tracking release dates so that members are redeployed and released in time to accomplish demobilization actions (e.g., leave, reconstitution and downtime, medical processing)
      - Planning for future requirements complicated for heavily used specialties

#### Lessons Learned

- AFR resource not unlimited under single PM authority--affects operational planning and sustainability
- Innovative approaches such as using Army Reserve Component support for AFRC base security can be pursued



#### Change in Planning / Execution Paradigm



- Previous deliberate/crisis planning paradigms not easily adapted to DEPORDcentric process
  - Coordination/processes required change frequently
  - Senior decision makers changed roles from direct involvement in deliberate and crisis planning to direct involvement in execution
- Problem Identified—Mobilization staff processes are not timely



#### System Support




- Air Force automated planning systems (e.g., ASPEN) not integrated with DCAPES; AFRC automated tracking systems not integrated with ASPEN
  - Duplication of effort
  - Increase likelihood of error
  - Increased processing time, delaying mobilization and deployment
  - Tracking personnel is problematic;
    - AF Reserve tracks until mobilization (and after, but not at a geographic-level of detail)
    - Active duty tracks after mobilization, but are not always able to know when members are moved to another location after their initial deployment location
- Problem Identified—Much work necessary to make systems streamline processes and track members; however significant progress already made with DCAPES—the <u>only</u> service system currently integrated with JOPES

- Redeployment priorities--Criteria not clearly articulated, appeared ad hoc; Should be based on long-term effects and consequences
  - First-in; first-out?
  - Mobilized ARC out first?
  - Mission-dependent, based on long-term sustainability?
- Lesson Learned—Criteria for redeployment should be established and clearly articulated



## ARC Mobilized vs. Volunteers



MOBREP data first collected 18 Sep 01; first personnel mobilized 21 Sep 01.

rntegrity - Service - Excerrence

- Volunteerism provides optimal use of ARC forces, maximizes the resource--obstacles to volunteerism should be minimized
- Lesson Learned—Provide parity of benefits between PM-ed members and MPA volunteers (e.g., TRICARE for families, BAH)
- Problem Identified—While members are allowed to volunteer for 365 day-MPA tours supporting GWOT, multiple waivers required
- Problem Identified--Need to provide motivation for Combatant Commanders to accept volunteers
  - CoComs prefer members who are committed to stay for longer periods
  - Perceptions that volunteers will just "pick up and leave" (they have even turned down 120-day volunteers in favor of PM-ed ARC members)
- <u>Lessons Learned</u>--Employer perceptions differ between PM and MPA volunteer

- Member <u>lesson learned</u>—Essentially EVERYONE is deployable
  - Family plan
  - Financial plan
- Community <u>lesson learned</u>—Need plan for replacement of SF, medical, EOD personnel in case of reserve mobilization



# Summary



- OIF Mission Accomplished
  - AF Total Force Concept worked—could not have been done without the ARC (volunteers + mobilized members)
    - Made possible by AF investment in force structure and readiness
    - Pre-9/11 ARC participation in AEF provided ideal preparation
  - Herculean team efforts overcame:
    - Only partially integrated planning and execution systems
    - Frequent mobilization process changes
  - Overall, AFRC forces were not fully exercised; however, small group of career fields were overtaxed (mobilized > 1 yr)
- Many lessons learned from ONE/OEF were applied to OIF; issues requiring development of in-depth solutions are being identified




# Recruiting and Retention





# FY 2003 Experience **Indicators**




## **AIRCREW** Avg. Years Experience

**→**Enlisted 13.3 **→Officer 13.8** 

## **SUPPORT** Avg. Years **Experience**

- → Enlisted 12.2
- **→Officer 14.3**





# AFRC Reenlistment Rates (FY 03)

First Term 79%

Second Term 73%

Career 95%




# AFRC Officer Selected Reserve Retention Rates

%	<b>FY99</b>	<b>FY00</b>	<b>FY01</b>	<b>FY02</b>	<b>FY03</b>
Pilots	90.1	87.9	91.6	94.4	89.0
<b>Navigators</b>	95.5	94.5	93.9	95.6	91.3
Non-Rated Sp	ot93.3	97.6	93.4	94.8	87.2
Support	92.2	93.3	92.3	93.5	89.4
<b>Non-Line</b>	90.9	92.6	91.7	93.9	87.8
Other	100	100	100	92.7	86.4
Overall	91.5	92.0	92.1	94.0	88.7




# Potential AD Accessions

**Prior to Stop Loss of 2002** 







HQ AFRC/RSOO



# Future Challenges...





# People Challenges

- Recruiting and Retention
  - Prior Service Member Availability
  - Recruiting Non-Prior Service Personnel
  - Recruiting of Active Duty Retirees
  - Pay/Entitlements/Benefits
  - Volunteerism
  - Mobilization/Demobilization Impacts
  - Family, Employer and Community Support
  - The Economy



# Readiness Challenges

- One Tier of Readiness Vice Tiered Readiness
- Accessibility-Reality Vice Perception
- Use of Reserve Members to Fill Needed Skills
- Combat Ready Vice Strategic Reserve Status
- Rising Cost of O&M with an Aging Fleet
- Continued Modifications of Equipment
  - Insure Interoperability
  - Relevant to Combatant CC Requirements
- Military Construction (MILCON) Funding Needs
- Potential Loss of National Guard and Reserve Equipment funding (NGREA)



- Impact of Force Structure Decisions
  - C-5 AMP/RERP Decisions
  - C-130J, F/A-22, JSF and Tanker lease Decisions
- Impact of Potential Rebalancing Decisions
- Stand-Up of Fighter Associate Units in FY04
- Utilization of Reserve Members in AOC, Global Hawk, UCAV and Future Space Operations Missions
- Funding for Expansion of IMA and Full-Time Positions
- Security Improvements Essential for Bases/Units
- Defining and Articulating the Differences between USAF Reserve Components and those of Other Services
- Impact of AF/AFRC BRAC Decisions



# Summation of Reasons for AFRC Success

### People

- Prior Service Experience
- Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program
- Management of Reservists by Reservists
- Family/Civilian Employer/Civic/Congressional Support

#### Readiness

- One Tier of Readiness in Air Force
- Readiness Standards Measured by Active Force
- Train and Deploy with Active Force

### Modernization

- Comparable/Interoperable Weapon Systems
- Combat Forces Remaining Relevant



**U.S. AIR FORCE** 







## **Questions?**



ABOVE SBEYOND